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474 HUDSON RAINVILLE C.2d 
No. 6691. In Bank. May 
JESSE R. HUDSON, Appellant, v. PATRICIA Y. 
RAINVILLE, Respondent. 
[1] Automobiles-Instructions-Care Toward Pedestrians.-In an 
action by a pedestrian against a motorist for sus-
tained when he was walking along a street, it was proper to 
refuse an instruction that the evidence established as a matter 
of law that the motorist was guilty of negligence and that 
such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident where 
there was testimony that the motorist was blinded by the 
clouds suddenly lifting and the sun striking her eyes, and by 
the reflection of the sun from the wet pavement, her negli-
gence being a question of fact for the jury under such cir-
cumstances. 
[2] Negligence-Questions of Law and Fact.-Whether defendant 
was guilty of negligence or plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence is ordinarily a question of mixed fact and law, 
and may be determined as a matter of law only if reasonable 
men following the law can draw but one conclusion from the 
evidence presented. 
[3] Automobiles- Province of Court and Jury- Contributory 
Negligence.-In an action by a pedestrian against a motorist 
for injuries sustained when he was walking along a street 
pulling a little wagon loaded with a bale of hay, it was proper 
to submit to the jury the question whether the pedestrian was 
contributively negligent where the jury could reasonably con-
clude from the evidence that in entering on a bottleneck of 
narrow pavement and traversing it without looking back for a 
period of time sufficient for traffic coming from one direction to 
reach him he failed to exercise proper care for his own safety, 
particularly where he was familiar with the portions of the 
street over which he was traveling and at that hour of the 
day traffic was generally heavy. 
[4] !d.-Contributory Negligence-Pedestrians.-Pedestrians who 
travel over the highways must exercise reasonable care for 
their own safety considering the conditions existing, and if 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Automobiles, § 245 et seq. 
[2] See Cal.Jur., Negligence, §§ 138, 141; Am.Jur., Negligence, 
§§ 344, 348. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Automobiles, § 335; [2] Negligence, 
§§ 158, 160, 168, 169; [3) Automobiles, § 297(1); [4, 7] Automo-
biles, § 126; [5] Automobiles, § 125; [6] Automobiles. §§ 293, 
371(1). 
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[6 Id.~Province of Court and Jury-Contributory Negligence.-
there is room for an honest difference of opinion be-
men of averag" whether plaintiff was negli-
to look in the direetion from which defendant's 
was approaching is a question of fact for the jury, 
the finding of the trier of fact is conclusive. 
!d.-Contributory Negligence-Pedestrians.--The law does not 
arbitrary standards as to what constitutes due care for 
own concern when a pedestrian is walking along a street 
a little wagon loaded with a bale of hay; it requires 
to exercise due care, which means that he must use his 
faeultiPs of sight and hearing for that purpose whenever a 
prudent man would do so. 
PPEAI~ from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sutter 
Arthur Coats, Judge. Affirmed. 
for damages for personal injuries. J ndgment for 
cldcmdant affirmed. 
& Blade, Clewe, Blade & McDonald and Ernest 
for Appellant. 
Pc'tm's & Peters and ,Jerome D. Peters, ,Jr., for Respondent. 
J.-Prom a judgment in favor of defendant 
aft.Pr trial before a jury in an action to recover damages for 
injuries, plaintiff appeals. 
J'IIarch 6, 1951, about 5 p.m., an accident occurred in 
City on B Street. It runs in a generally eastrrly and 
direction. Plaintiff lives on the north side of the 
street about 300 feet east of the point where the accident 
octurred. The street in front of plaintiff's home is paved 
with rconcrete and is 5611:; feet from curb to curb. 
hundred sixty-six and one half feet west of a path 
whid1 leads from plaintiff's house to the sidewalk the con-
I' crete pavement abruptly narrows to 25 feet in width with earth and rock shoulders upon either side. L 
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There is a concrete sidewalk on the north side of the 
street from a point east of plaintiff's home to a point about 
60 feet west of it. 
The day had been cloudy with intermittent rain and sun-
shine, and the pavement was wet. The sun was low on the 
horizon to the west. Traffic on the portion of B Street where 
the accident occurred was generally heavy about 5 p.m., and 
this fact was known to plaintiff. 
Plaintiff took a bale of hay out of his garage, put it on a 
little wagon which he pulled after him as he started toward 
his horses which he kept in a fenced pasture just west of 
his home and located on the same side of the street. 
He followed the sidewalk on the north side to the end 
thereof, and proceeded along near the curb for about 200 
feet to the point wher~ the street pavement narrowed. Here 
he turned left and followed the pavement edge to the point 
where the narrow pavement began. At this time he looked 
in both directions. He saw a car approaching from the west 
several hundred feet away, but saw nothing coming from 
the east. He turned right and proceeded to walk west. 
All four wheels of the wagon he was pulling were on the north 
edge of the 25-foot pavement. After he had gone about 
33 feet west from the beginning of the narrow pavement he 
was struck from the rear by an automobile driven by defend-
ant. He had not looked back as he walked along the narrow 
pavement. 
Defendant entered the street at a point east of plaintiff's 
home and proceeded west. ·when she arrived in front of 
plaintiff's home she saw two automobiles double-parked on 
the north side of the street. At this time she was traveling 
about 30 miles per hour. As she approached the two parked 
cars she saw an automobile coming from the west. She 
swerved left to go around the parked cars and then drove 
her car back to the right side of the road. 
During the moment preceding the accident the only ve-
hicles moving on the street were the automobile coming from 
the west and defendant's car. 
As defendant came close to the point where the pavement 
narrowed and as she turned right into her own lane of travel, 
having passed the parked cars, the sun suddenly emerged from 
behind the clouds and its direct light and the reflection from 
the wet pavement blinded her. She immediately applied her 
brakes and threw her hands in front of her face. At ap-
proximately the same time she struck plaintiff. At this time 
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was traveling about 30 miles per hour and had not seen 
rn1:~.tacJcJL until the moment she struck him. 
claims the trial court erred : 
First: In refusing to give the following instru<Jtion 
hC< requesteil,: "You are instructed that the evidence in 
case lws establisheil as a matter of law that the defendant 
guilty of negligence and that such negligence was the 
,:, .. ,~,1c\rrut:te oouse of the accident here in question.'' 
instruction was properly refused. There was testi-
mony that defendant was blinded by the clouds suddenly 
and the sun striking her eyes; also that she was 
m.u1ue:u by the reflection of the sun from the wet pavement. 
From the evidence the jury could have found that defendant 
was guilty of negligence that proximately and solely caused 
the accident in failing to see plaintiff. On the other hand, 
the jury could have found that the accident was proximately 
solely caused by defendant's being blinded by the rays 
sun which suddenly appeared as she p:1ssed the double-
car and turned back to her own lane of travel to 
the oncoming car and that her conduct was that of a 
rea.stntau.u:: and prudent person in view of the circumstances. 
there was a question of fact which the trial court 
left for the determination of the trier of fact. {See 
v. Fraze, 136 Cal.App.2d 415 at 430 [12] [288 P.2d 
; Ribble v. Oook, 111 Cal.App.2d 903 at 907 (2} [245 
593); Garcia v. Heaton, 90 Cal.App.2d 591 at 592 [1] 
P.2d 560]; and Lenning v. Ohiolo, 63 Cal.App.2d 511 
at 515 [3] [147 P.2d 410].) 
[2] The rule is accurately stated by Mr. Justice Schauer 
in Gray v. Brinkerhoff, 41 Cal.2d 180 at 183 [1) [258 P.2d 
, thus: "Whether or not defendant was guilty of negli-
( citing eases) or plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
(citing cases) is ordinarily a question of mixed 
aud law and may be determined as a matter of law only 
reasonable men following the law can draw but one con-
clusion from the evidence presented (citing cases).H (Me-
v. Hendrickson, 58 Cal.App.2d 60, 62 et seq. [136 
110]; see also cases cited in 34 West's Cal.Dig. (1951) 
287, 290, Negligence, §§ 136(9) a, 136(9) b.) 
Huetter v. Andrews, 91 Cal.App.2d 142 [204 P.2d 655], 
relied on by plaintiff, is not here in point for the reason that 
the cited case there were none of the distracting elements 
occurred in the instant ease; that is, there was no evi-
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dence of immediate or sudden emergency blinding the 
:fendant such as that testified to by defendant here. 
[3] Second: In submitting to the jury the question 
whether plaintiff was contributively negligent. 
The trial judge's ruling was correct. Plaintiff contends 
that as a matter of law he was not contributively negligent. 
This proposition is not sound. From the evidence the jury 
could reasonably conclude that in entering upon the bottle-
neck of the narrow pavement and traversing it without 
looking back :for a period of time sufficient for traffic coming 
from the east to reach him, plaintiff was negligent in failing 
to exercise proper care for his own safety. Particularly is 
this true in view of the evidence that plaintiff was familiar 
with the portions of the street over which he was travelirtg 
and at that hour of the day traffic was generally heavy, 
even though at that particular moment only one car to his 
knowledge was using the part of the street which he was 
traversing. 
[4] Pedestrians, as well as every person who travels over 
the highvvays by whatever means must exercise reasonable 
care for their own safety, considering the conditions existing. 
If they fail in the exercise of such care and tltereby con-
tribute proximately to the cause of any injury they may 
sustain as the result of another who has equal rights using 
the highway, they are guilty of contributory negligence. 
[5] It is not the law that a pedestrian has a right to travel 
anywhere upon a public highway and is therefore not negli-
gent in doing so. (Rangel v. Badolato, 133 Cal.App.2d 254 
at 266 [284 P.2d 138] .) 
[6] Whenever there is room for an honest difference of 
opinion between men of average intelligence, the question of 
whether plaintiff is negligent in failing to look again in the 
direction from which defendant's car is approaching is a 
question of fact for the jury, and the finding of the trier of 
fact is conclusive. (Salomon v. Meyer, 1 Cal.2d 11 at 15 
r2] [32 P.2d 631] ; McQ1Iigg v. Childs, 213 Cal. 661 at 664 
[ 4] [3 P.2d 309] .) 
[7] The law does not set arbitrary standards as to what 
constitutes due care for one's own concern when a pedestrian 
is situated as was plaintiff. It does not say he must look 
back, nor that he need never do so. It requires him to ex-
ercise due care, which means that he must use his faculties 
of sight and hearing for that purpose whenever a reasonably 
prudent man would do so. He may go upon the street, but 
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or not under the circumstances then existing his 
evinces a proper care for his own safety is generally 
u.v''"'~" of fact for the determination of the trier of fact. 
supra; Hendricks v. Pappas, 82 Cal. 
774 at 778 [187 P.2d 436] ; Hamlin v. Pacijio 
150 CaL 776 at 781 P. .) 
C. J., Shenk, J., Traynor, 
concurred. 
J.-I dissent. 
Schauer, J., and 
was prejudicial error for the trial court to submit to 
the issue of contributory negligence, and the judg-
should be reversed on this ground. Under no rational 
can it be said that there was any negligence on the 
of plaintiff which in any way contributed to the acci-
dent here involved. According to the undisputed evidence, 
uw·'"""'' ·was walking along the far right side of a street in 
a residential district pulling a wagon on which was loaded a 
of hay which he was taking· to feed his horses that 
were pastured on the right-hand side of the street. It was 
the street was straight and visibility good. There 
were no sidewalks nor place for him to travel except where 
he was. Defendant, driving a car, struck him from the rear. 
I there was no contributory negligence because there was 
he, the pedestrian, could have done. 
Inasmuch as the street was in a residential section it was 
not necessary for him to be traveling along his left side 
of it as is required by section 564 of the Vehicle Code when 
a person is walking on a road outside a business or residential 
district. 
The conclusion reached by the majority is contrary to the 
following authorities: Wilson v. Kestenholz, 113 Cal.App. 
13 [297 P. 954]; Stealey v. Chessttrn, 123 Cal.App. 446 [11 
P.2d 428] ; Buchignoni v. DeHaven, 23 Cal.App.2d 76 [72 
P.2d 159] ; Keating v. Zumwalt, 91 Cal.App.2d 845 [206 
10]; Raymond v. Hill, 168 Cal. 473 [143 P. 743]; Burk 
Extrafine Bread Bakery, 208 Cal. 105 [280 P. 522]; and 
"'n"'"'~""'u'm, v. Rucker-Fuller Desk Co., 197 Cal. 82 [239 P. 
41 A.L.R. 1027]. (See also 93 A.L.R. 551; 67 id. 96.) 
cases either hold or state that where a pedestrian is in 
roadway where he is entitled to be and proceeding forward 
the road he has no duty to look to the rear. There 
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is nothing for him to do. He may assume that the traffic ap-
proaching from his rear will observe him and take proper 
precautions especially since the view is unobstructed. Even 
.if he looked back there still would be no occasion for him to 
do anything as he could assume that any car approaching him 
would see him and avoid hitting him. 
While the issue of defendant's negligence may have been 
one for the jury, the only reasonable conclusion is that plain-
tiff was not guilty of contributory negligence and the jury 
should have been instructed accordingly. 
The holding of the majority here is in direct conflict with 
Gray v. Brinkerhoff, 41 Cal.2d 180 [258 P.2d 834], and the 
very recent case of Weeks v. Raper, 139 Cal.App.2d 737 
[294 P.2d 178] (hearing denied by this court on May 2, 
1956). 
While the evidence here is such that reasonable minds 
might differ on the issue of defendant's negligence, this can-
not be true as to plaintiff's conduct, which was entirely blame-
less under the law applicable to one in his position. 
I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied June 6, 
1956. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
